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AUTHOR Bernstein, James M.
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ABSTRACT

The books, newspaper columns, articles, and speeches of Walter Lippmann were analyzed to determine the journalist's First Amendment viewpoints in four periods when national security was an issue in the United States. These periods were (1) after World War I, (2) after the Korean War, (3) during World War II, and (4) during the war in Vietnam. The analysis revealed that at times when national security was a dominant issue, Lippmann was skeptical of majority rule, a basic democratic principle, because he thought many members of the public were ill-informed. However, throughout his career, Lippmann strongly advocated freedom of information and open debate, and saw these concepts as conditions for greater participation in democratic processes. The findings suggest that although Lippmann did not take an absolutist approach to the First Amendment, he certainly advocated wide-spread freedom of expression for the press and individuals. (FL)

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WALTER LIPPMANN AND FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS:

A NEW PERSPECTIVE

James M. Bernstein
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

Despite the fact that Walter Lippmann wrote ten million words during his career, despite the fact his life and work have been analyzed by no fewer than a dozen biographers, Lippmann remains an enigma seven years after his death. Was he a liberal or a conservative? Was he consistent when he addressed important issues? Was he a leader of public opinion or a follower? Perhaps one of the few things on which students of Lippmann agree is his preeminence among twentieth-century journalists and political thinkers.¹

Lippmann students also seem to agree on a central theme through which they have interpreted his works and his life: his political philosophy. From the progressive era to the Vietnam era, analyses of Lippmann evolve into discussions of his basic principles, whether the original focus be New Deal economics, the Cold War or U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. From this emphasis seem to come many of the perplexities and complexities surrounding Lippmann's work. What seems a progressive or liberal point of view to some appears the epitome of conservatism to others. To some authors Lippmann was flexible and open-minded; to others he was indecisive and inconsistent.

The problem is no less apparent in determining Lippmann's views on the First Amendment. From the perspective of one recent biographer, John Luskin, Lippmann was not the

absolutist many of his followers thought him to be,² an opinion with which Lippmann himself was inclined to agree.³ But Luskin's apparent belief that Lippmann had adopted an anti-democratic viewpoint pertaining to press and speech freedoms deserves scrutiny from another perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to determine Lippmann's views toward First Amendment freedoms, looking at those views in the context of national security issues.⁴ It is hypothesized that during periods of time when national security issues have been dominant in the United States, Lippmann would have been more likely to favor placing restrictions on private individuals than on the press. For example, during wartime, Lippmann would have favored censorship of individuals whose speech may have impaired the war effort. But he would have argued that newspapers should enjoy greater protection from censorship during the same time period. Underlying the hypothesis of Lippmann's preference are three principles that will be explored later in the paper: 1) Lippmann's skepticism of public opinion; 2) his belief that democracy serves and is served best with a better informed public; and 3) Lippmann's apparent belief that the media, particularly newspapers, are best equipped to educate and inform the public.

LITERATURE REVIEW

By the 1930s Lippmann had established himself as one of the foremost liberal commentators in the nation, having written editorials for the New York World throughout the 1930s. Not even the appearance of his "Today and Tomorrow" column in 1931 in the New York Herald Tribune, a Republican newspaper by reputation, could detract from his notoriety as a liberal.⁵ But several of his contemporaries made attempts to dispute Lippmann's liberal tag.

In the sixth of a series of profiles on American columnists, Margaret Marshall admitted that Lippmann had been "an early liberal," apparently alluding to his days with the Wilson administration and his work with the New Republic. But, Marshall claimed, he was using that handle to misrepresent himself:

...it may be said that those elements in Lippmann's attitudes which may...be called liberal and social are irrelevant to the issues of the day. Those which are most relevant are not liberal but reactionary and personal.⁶

In theory, Marshall seemed to be saying, Lippmann could pass himself off as a liberal; in practice, though, she believed him to be serving the interests of conservatives, particularly when he wrote about economic policies of the Roosevelt administration.⁷

Another journalist of the day, Silas Bent, also saw

a theoretically liberal, but a practically conservative Lippmann. Bent said Lippmann was among those personal journalists "more nearly representative of the liberal temper," writing to and for readers who were "vigilant for civil liberty, would cut the excesses of industrial monopoly and finance banking, and would like to improve the condition of the underprivileged."⁸ But, Bent wrote, representing liberals did not make Lippmann one:

Those who arrogate to themselves the title of liberal are first to bid farewell to reform and to profess despair of their cause.⁹

By endorsing the Republicans and their anti-New Deal economic policies, Bent said, Lippmann had relinquished his claim to liberalism.

It was Lippmann's opposition to the New Deal that made liberal acceptance of him so difficult in subsequent years, Christopher Lasch wrote thirty years later. But, Lasch said, Lippmann had already distinguished himself as a 1930s conservative in his columns dealing with international issues. Lippmann's refusal to join liberals in their embrace of Stalinism showed in Lippmann qualities of non-conformity and foresight, Lasch said:

He condemned Stalinism as a form of totalitarianism at a time when it was still fashionable to dismiss objections to the Soviet regime as evincing an old-maidish preference for "political" against "economic" democracy.¹⁰

Lasch's characterization of the way critics dismissed Lippmann's fear of Stalinism is important. It implies that Lippmann critics themselves were able to distinguish his desire for "political" democracy--an open society

governed by law--from his disdain for collectivism espoused by socialist regimes. The distinction is emphasized here because it is necessary to show support for the hypothesis.

Although Luskin seems to have made the distinction in his book on Lippmann's views of the First Amendment, he maintained that Lippmann had given up on democracy as a way to solve the world's problems:

A democratic solution of problems, Lippmann emphasized...is possible only in a society committed to democratic principles. Lippmann's own definition of those principles, especially as they touched on liberty of speech and the press, set tighter limits on freedom of expression than some of his contemporaries believed compatible with democracy.¹¹

Luskin accurately pointed out contradictions Lippmann had made when writing about the First Amendment freedoms of those who supported radical movements,¹² but Luskin failed to indicate the proper reasons for the contradictions. Luskin attributed Lippmann's advocacy of First Amendment infringement by government in these cases to Lippmann's despair with the democratic system, when, in fact, it could have been Lippmann's desire to preserve democracy that prompted him to advocate restrictions on freedom of speech in some cases.

This is a point Steel made in his 1980 biography of Lippmann.¹³ Although Lippmann by the mid-1920s had rejected the concept of "government by the masses" popularized in the eighteenth century, Steel said, his suspicion of mass rule could become "a defense of democracy," because from mass rule comes "unrestrained majoritarianism" and suppression of minority rights.¹⁴ "His attitude toward censorship was

clearly not absolutist," Steel wrote. "It depended on the context and the kind of censorship involved."¹⁵ Steel's interpretation must be taken into account, even though his definitive work on Lippmann did not narrowly focus on the First Amendment context, as Luskin's did.

METHOD

This study not only focuses on Lippmann's First Amendment viewpoints, but it also further narrows the context to his views on press and speech freedoms during times of national security. Using the biographies of Luskin and Steel to isolate research periods, the researcher has selected four periods for study, all believed to have been times when either national defense, foreign policy or internal security were prevalent issues in the United States. During two post-war periods--after World War I and the Korean War--fears over the threat of communism brought internal security issues to the forefront. The two wartime periods, World War II and the Vietnam War, were chosen for their relevance to the foreign policy and national defense elements.

The Luskin and Steel biographies have also been useful in selecting primary sources for the study. Lippmann was a prolific writer; however, citations from the biographies have provided direction that makes the study of primary sources more manageable. For the post-World War I period, three Lippmann works--Liberty and the News, Public Opinion and The Phantom Public--have been used to show the basis for the themes underlying the hypothesis. Lippmann's columns,

articles and speeches will provide the basis for the research of the other three periods.

FINDINGS

I

As mentioned earlier, Lippmann had a reputation as a liberal, no doubt well-deserved when one considers that he formed the Harvard Socialist Club, served an apprenticeship under Lincoln Steffens and was among the members of the New Republic's first editorial staff.¹⁶ However, the closer the United States came to involving itself in war with Germany, the farther removed politically Lippmann became from radical, pacifist colleagues. When the country entered the European war in 1917, Lippmann took an active part, first as an assistant to the secretary of war, then as a propagandist for the Army.¹⁷ Although Lippmann had not yet relinquished his progressivist idealism at this time, the roots of his distrust of the masses were developing.

Lippmann did not come full circle to his eventual attack on traditional democratic theory until about seven years after the armistice. His journey to that end started in 1920 when he wrote a three-part magazine series that¹⁸ was published as a book called Liberty and the News.

In this short treatise Lippmann recognized the increasing power of public opinion, but seemed unalarmed by it. Rather, he was more concerned with ensuring that the public had free access to information untainted by propagandists and censors:

For when a people can no longer confidently repair "to the best fountains for their information," then anyone's guess and anyone's rumor, each man's hope and each man's whim becomes the basis for government.¹⁹

Government policies will be useless, he said, "if the propagandists and censors can put a painted screen where there should be a window to the world."²⁰ Having accepted the public's role in government and its need for information to serve that role, Lippmann placed the burden of providing information on the press, the "bible of democracy, the book out of which a people determines its conduct."²¹ Higher standards for reporting and greater efforts to reach the truth were needed, Lippmann said, perhaps through systematic, scientific approaches to the issues.²²

Lippmann systematically tested the performance of the press a few months later. In a 42-page supplement to the New Republic, he and friend Charles Merz reported their findings of a study of New York Times coverage of the Bolshevik revolution. Throughout the three-year period under study, they said, the newspaper's reporters and editors let their own biases and desires enter into their coverage. The resulting inaccuracies, they said, made "the news about Russia...a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see."²³

Perhaps as important as the findings was an admission by Lippmann and Merz "that a sound public opinion cannot exist without access to the news."²⁴ This premise seems to imply that as long as free, uncensored access to the news exists, the people will direct their mandate responsibly.

Within five years Lippmann had reversed that position.

According to Steel, the reversal developed when Lippmann began to doubt the thesis established in Liberty and the News that a properly informed public could make rational decisions. The doubts were apparently triggered by his experiences in World War I.

Having learned from his wartime propaganda work how the facts could be distorted and suppressed, he realized that distortion was also imbedded in the very workings of the human mind.²⁵

It was in his classic work Public Opinion that this realization was expressed. In the book Lippmann began to reject the idea in Liberty and the News that an "omnicompetent citizen" could make sound decisions as long as he had free flow of information. Lippmann's reasoning was based on the idea that each person's beliefs were founded in that person's immediate environment. An opinion based on first-hand knowledge--for example, an opinion on local taxes or schools--could be considered sound. But opinions about issues on which little first-hand knowledge existed--foreign policy and military budgets, for example--came from an environment adulterated "by censorship and privacy at the source, by physical and social barriers at the other end."²⁶ The result, Lippmann said, was a breakdown in the traditional democracy adhered to since the eighteenth century:

The orthodox theory holds that public opinion constitutes a moral judgement on a group of facts. The theory I am suggesting is that, in the present state of education, a public opinion is primarily a moralized and codified version of the facts.²⁷

Lippmann said the traditional theory may have worked

in small community settings. But, he said, to a greater extent people were being asked to make decisions about a world they knew little about:

It is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to self-deception, and to a form of persuasion we cannot verify.²⁸

Lippmann also rejected the traditionally democratic concept that a free press would result in a well informed public, again drawing on his experiences from the war and his study of the New York Times. Those episodes had indicated to him the unlikelihood that the press could "make the invisible world visible to the citizens of a modern state."²⁹ He clarified his skepticism when he wrote of the distinction between news and truth. "The function of news," he said, "is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with one another, and make a picture of reality on which men can act." With seeming resignation, Lippmann said that even when the press reported the news accurately, there was that possibility the facts had been tainted.³⁰

Lippmann's rejection of the basic principles of democracy--the omniscient man and the free press to inform him--has been interpreted by some (Lusk among them) as a sign of despair. Lippman obviously was skeptical of the "dogma" of democracy, but it can be argued that he continued to search for ways to make a democratic system work. He provided an outline of sorts in The Phantom Public.³¹

In the book Lippmann restated that the idea that the individual was inherently capable of making informed decisions and directing public affairs was a "false idea."³² Still, he said, a place should be found for the public "so that it may exercise its powers, but no less and perhaps even more, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and the roar of the bewildered herd."³³ Rejecting majoritarianism, Lippmann said the public's role was not to govern, but to judge those who do:

...instead of describing government as an expression of the people's will, it would seem better to say that government consists of a body of officials... who handle problems which come to public opinion spasmodically and on appeal. Where parties directly responsible do not work out an adjustment, public officials intervene. When the officials fail, public opinion is brought to bear.³⁴

It is at that point that open debate is necessary for informed public opinion, Lippmann said. He apparently believed that the open debate was the true meaning of freedom of speech for it would ultimately expose the truth. However, until the occasion during which public opinion was made necessary, he said, public officials could withhold the truth:

There is nothing misleading in a frank refusal to tell. The mischief comes in a pretense that all is being told, that the public is entirely in the confidence of the public man.³⁵

But how is that pretense to be known? It is a riddle Lippmann never seemed to have fully answered. Forty years after The Phantom Public Lippmann addressed himself to the conflict between the people's right to know and the government's ability to deliberate confidentially. It was

a continuing, perhaps unresolvable conflict, he said. The give-and-take between journalists and government officials, though not "a neat or an elegant relationship," was "a modus vivendi which works tolerably well, at least in times of peace."³⁶ Whether the arrangement worked in wartime Lippmann did not say; his views of the relationship must be revealed through his wartime writings.

II

The themes of Lippmann's books in the 1920s were repeated still in the months preceding U.S. entry into World War II. Using his popular "Today and Tomorrow" column, Lippmann exposed millions of newspaper readers to his idea that public opinion did not lead to or spring from democracy, but results in and comes from demagoguery. In an April 1941 column Lippmann again rejected traditional democracy and its belief that public opinion could decide important issues. The idea, he said, "destroys the sense of responsibility in public men and deprives public opinion of leadership."³⁷ Lippmann refused to trust mass opinion, preferring to rely on public men or leaders to form policies. Only when leadership failed should public opinion intervene.

Lippmann apparently thought public intervention was necessary a month later, when he called on President Roosevelt to assure the American people that the government was taking proper action in regard to the conflict in Europe. "Whatever actions required by the events," he wrote, "they will be supported with confidence only if they are clearly

explained and only if the nation is convinced that the effort at home is equal to the risks and the dangers which threaten it from abroad."³⁸

Here Lippmann seems to be indicating a situation in which greater information for the public was necessary. Failure by Roosevelt to inform the American people of his foreign policies had resulted in chaotic policies, more susceptible to demagogic isolationists.³⁹ This is certainly not advocacy of censorship, but an extension of Lippmann's belief in a system of democracy in which information flowed from leadership to the public rather than vice versa.

After the United States entered the war, Lippmann often criticized the Roosevelt administration for its failure to be more open with the American people. The early war effort was hampered, Lippmann said, not because of problems with overseas information, but with domestic information. The failure of the president to properly empower Elmer Davis and the Office of War Information was symptomatic of the problem. The result was a lack of essential information about such policies as gas rationing and price and wage fixing.

Lippmann thought the people deserved to get more than information on the final decision; greater explanation of the background and decision-making process was needed. Lippmann seemed to recapture some of his faith in the press to overcome the barriers preventing this information from coming to the fore. "We shall...muddle through...because the press, understanding the plight of orphaned experts, takes them under its protection and sees them through their ordeal."⁴⁰

The United States had participated in the war less than a year when again Lippmann felt compelled to urge the president to clear the air over his policies and be more open with the press. He carefully avoided the suggestion that Roosevelt be entirely candid in terms of war plans but, he said, the public must be informed about the success of those plans:

While it is self-evident that the lay public cannot and should not dictate future operations to commanders, it is no less evident that the lay public has a right and a duty to insist upon accountability after an event.⁴¹

It seems here that Lippmann believed the "give-and-take" relationship between the government and the press was mostly "take" and little "give" by the government.

Lippmann at times seemed to be suggesting that the press give some also. In one column he resigned himself to the fact that war plans would occasionally, if inadvertently, be printed in newspapers. The solution, he said, was not suppression of information, but sending out conflicting reports to confuse the enemy. "The only method of concealment for free and talkative countries like America would...be to create confusion," he said.⁴² This idea was no doubt as distasteful to some journalists as the idea of censorship.

Other events prompted Lippmann to urge journalists to propagandize, for he believed the American people were "writing one of the great chapters in...history" through their war effort.⁴³ However, he constantly derided President Roosevelt's propaganda efforts. He suggested the existence of a cover-up when Roosevelt employed professional speech writers;⁴⁴ he

accused federal agencies of incompetency when "soft publicity" was released by the Roosevelt administration;⁴⁵ and he claimed "manipulation of public opinion" when Roosevelt used a hand-picked journalist to release information on policy in North Africa.⁴⁶

The distinction Lippmann seems to have made between propaganda by the press and that by the government is similar to the one he made between news and truth. He did not suggest the press lie when it wrote tributes to the American war effort; the news would merely reveal more of the true story. On the other hand, government tactics militated against revelation of the whole truth. Through this distinction we can find support for the proposition that Lippmann favored free and open dialogue in certain instances. During World War II, those cases revolve around balancing the public's ability to assess the war effort with the government's ability to achieve military victory. Lippmann thought the balance was attained when the government gave account of its actions, some of which he thought were implemented secretly.

III

By the mid-1950s Lippmann had become the press's foremost commentator on foreign affairs.⁴⁷ Steel and Lasch have claimed his preoccupation with foreign policy led to a neglect of domestic issues. The McCarthy era may be a case in point, although Lippmann did devote a few columns to the tactics of the junior senator from Wisconsin.

Lippmann believed the American people had become

obsessed with McCarthy, even though he may not have been. This obsession rekindled in Lippmann a distrust of the public. His belief in an easily manipulated mass, mostly reliant on stereotypes, was again being realized. But as the public learned about Joseph McCarthy, the realization became what "true believers in the freedom of the press have always counted upon:"

It is that given prolonged and uninhibited reporting, it is not only impossible to fool all the people all the time, but it becomes progressively more difficult to fool even some of the people all the time.⁴⁸

One can only infer that Lippmann counted himself among "true believers," although thirty years earlier he had expressed doubt over whether the press was capable of the kinds of achievements made during the McCarthy era. However, his columns on McCarthy and the press lend further support to the idea that Lippmann's skepticism of public opinion lessened as the public learned more about a particular issue, particularly when that knowledge was obtained through a free press.

It should be noted here, also, that at least in the case of the McCarthy era, Lippmann did not indicate a stronger preference for press freedoms than for individual speech freedoms. In fact, no evidence could be found showing that Lippmann advocated suppressing Senator McCarthy, even though he saw in McCarthy's words "seeds of totalitarianism."⁴⁹

In the aftermath of the McCarthy era, Lippmann assessed the damage. Among the victims, the First Amendment:

The effect has been--not to shut off but--to clamp down and in a degree to smother the full exercise of the traditional American freedom of thought and of speech.⁵⁰

Even in the context of the frightening potential of McCarthyism, Lippmann's words are not overstated.

IV

Lippmann's support for full speech freedoms and open debate are displayed again during the events surrounding the Vietnam War. Steel wrote that Lippmann had supported President Johnson's policies through May 1965, when reports by the foreign press of U.S. blunders began to catch his eye.⁵¹ But in March of that year Lippmann was showing disillusionment, not with the administration's war policies as much as with Johnson's failure to recognize dissent over those policies. The president, Lippmann said, thinks "the only safe and patriotic course is to suspend all debate and rally around the President."⁵² That Johnson claimed to have the weight of public opinion behind his policies did nothing to endear him to Lippmann either.

To Lippmann it mattered little where mass support for the war lay, although he sympathized with student anti-war demonstrators who, he believed, were protesting the lack of information coming from the administration. "There is only one way that a democratic people can be won over and convinced," he said, "and that is by enabling this people to hear informed debate by its responsible leaders."⁵³ This echoes a sentiment Lippmann expressed during World War II: that once implemented, foreign policy must be presented in the public forum so that leaders can be made accountable. And it represents Lippmann's belief that a democratic system

is best-served by a well informed citizenry.

By 1967 Lippmann's frustrations with the Johnson administration had reached epic proportions. He lashed out at the president, calling him "a pathologically secretive man." No longer did the government's need to conduct foreign policy in confidence outweigh the people's right to know. "The compulsive passion for secretiveness coincides with a lack of understanding and consequent disrespect for free journalism," Lippmann said.⁵⁴ This is a classic example of Lippmann disclaiming the need for government secrecy to implement foreign policy, and it also supports the idea that Lippmann favored great First Amendment freedoms in certain national security situations.

Further support is found in Lippmann's praise for the work of Harrison Salisbury, who was the first American journalist to report the war from behind enemy lines. Accusations that Salisbury was a tool of enemy propaganda were fallacious, Lippmann said, questioning the difference between enemy propaganda and American propaganda.⁵⁵

Lippmann also applauded the press's handling of the Pentagon Papers incident, likening publication of the papers to the Boston Tea Party:

When you have a grievance and the grievance is to know how you got into one of the most costly wars in your history, and the government won't tell you, and has overclassified and hidden things--then, you have to do something to force the information out in the open. ⁵⁶

Again, Lippmann found the trigger for ending government secrecy in the need to keep the public informed of important policy.

CONCLUSION

It cannot be argued that Walter Lippmann was an absolutist on First Amendment issues, for he plainly believed that in certain circumstances, allowing total freedom of expression would ultimately result in majoritarianism. Ironically, it is from this fear of complete majority rule that one finds Lippmann's support of another basic democratic principle, minority rights. So the idea that Lippmann did not advocate freedom of expression cannot be supported either.

Support for the paper's hypothesis and the principles underlying it is found in certain circumstances. But because of Lippmann's propensity for ad hoc evaluations, the hypothesis and underlying principles must be rejected in other cases. One observation can be made about Lippmann: throughout his career he advocated a public need to have information about government operations. The achievement of that principle seems to have been a determinant for Lippmann of whether First Amendment freedoms should follow.

In his works on public opinion during the 1920s, Lippmann vacillated on whether the public was being adequately informed. Early in the decade he believed it was, and his trust of the public and in its members' rights to freely express themselves can be found. By the end of the decade,

however, he had lost faith in the idea of a properly informed public and, as a result, in the traditionally democratic concept of free expression. Still, the idea of open debate appealed to him as a way to achieve a better informed citizenry.

His advocacy of freedom of and to information increased during World War II when he continually criticized the Roosevelt administration for withholding information about the American war effort. Lippmann believed President Roosevelt should have entrusted the news media with more information so that Americans could better evaluate the war effort. Lippmann himself advocated expansive press freedoms, suggesting that journalists publish misleading stories and propaganda to aid the country.

Lippmann's faith in the press and public opinion was revived during the McCarthy era. Despite previous fears of majoritarianism and concern that Senator McCarthy's tactics would result in the reversal of speech and press freedoms, Lippmann never proposed McCarthy's censure. And, in fact, he believed the exposure and rejection of McCarthy's philosophies were attributable to the press and the robust freedoms it enjoyed.

During the Vietnam era Lippmann's support of free, open debate on the issues increased as his support of Johnson administration policies dwindled. Again, at the heart of the change of support was Lippmann's requirement that the public have enough information on which to base their opinions.

President Johnson's claims that public opinion support justified his Vietnam policies meant nothing to Lippmann, who thought the public ill-informed at the time.

Walter Lippmann did not hold to precepts of traditional democracy based on the ability of the people to govern. But he did not abandon a belief that democratic solutions to governmental problems were possible. Nor did he lose sight of the importance of free, open debate as a method for reaching solutions.

Because he believed that people's experiences were greatly confined, Lippmann could not accept traditional democracy or its underlying principles. But because of that confinement Lippmann saw the need to make information readily available to the public so that it could make decisions when called upon, especially during periods when national security was said to be threatened.

Whether that information came from the press or individuals seems to have made no difference to Lippmann. But beliefs he expressed in the 1920s that the press could not guarantee unadulterated information changed somewhat in later years when he seemed to realize the greater ability of the institution to make sure great issues were discussed. These abilities were clearly shown during the McCarthy and Vietnam eras. It is in the context of these two periods and the World War II era that support can be found for the proposition that Walter Lippmann endorsed a greater degree of First Amendment freedom than some have indicated.

NOTES

¹See James R. Dickenson, "He Was His Century's Quintessential Man," The National Observer, December 28, 1974, p. 15; John Luskin, Lippmann, Liberty, and the Press (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press); Janet Mandelstam, "The pragmatist; When Walter Lippmann spoke, people listened," The Detroit News, September 28, 1980, p. 2F.

²Luskin, op. cit.

³Ronald Steel, "The World We're In, An Interview with Walter Lippmann," New Republic, November 13, 1971, p. 20. When asked whether a news organization had a right to publish anything it believed to be in the national interest, Lippmann said: "Less and less as life goes on, because I have come to believe there are no absolute rights."

⁴The assumption here is that issues of national defense, foreign policy and internal security have imposed the most rigorous tests on individual freedoms throughout the country's history.

⁵Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 279-282.

⁶Margaret Marshall, "Columnists on Parade," The Nation, April 23, 1938, p. 464.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Silas Bent, "Personal Journalists," Saturday Review, December 12, 1936, p. 4.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Christopher Lasch, "Walter Lippmann Today," The New York Review of Books, December 9, 1965, p. 25.

¹¹Luskin, op. cit., p. 239.

¹²Ibid., p. 240.

¹³Steel, op. cit., Walter Lippmann.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 226-227.

- 15Ibid., p. 209.
- 16Ibid., pp. 12-87.
- 17Ibid., pp. 116-154.
- 18Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920).
- 19Ibid., p. 11.
- 20Ibid., p. 12.
- 21Ibid., p. 47.
- 22Ibid., pp. 82-83.
- 23Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, "A Test of the News," The New Republic, August 4, 1920, p. 3.
- 24Ibid., p. 1.
- 25Steel, op. cit., Walter Lippmann, p. 181.
- 26Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), p. 76.
- 27Ibid., p. 125.
- 28Ibid., p. 249.
- 29Ibid., p. 320.
- 30Ibid., pp. 358-359.
- 31Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1925).
- 32Ibid., pp. 13-39.
- 33Ibid., p. 155.
- 34Ibid., pp. 72-73.
- 35Ibid., p. 160.
- 36Walter Lippmann, A Free Press, An Address to the Fourteenth IPI Assembly, May 27, 1965, p. 8.
- 37Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," April 10, 1941.
- 38Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," May 17, 1941.
- 39Ibid.

⁴⁰Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," June 16, 1942 and July 11, 1942.

⁴¹Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," October 15 and 20, 1942.

⁴²Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," July 30, 1942.

⁴³Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," February 23, 1943.

⁴⁴Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," March 14, 1942.

⁴⁵Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," June 25, 1942.

⁴⁶Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," July 10, 1943.

⁴⁷Steel, op. cit., Walter Lippmann, p. 417.

⁴⁸Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," March 25, 1954.

⁴⁹Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," March 1, 1954.

⁵⁰Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," December 27, 1954.

⁵¹Steel, op. cit., Walter Lippmann, pp. 568-569.

⁵²Walter Lippmann, "Can the Question of War be Debated?" Newsweek, March 15, 1965, p. 23.

⁵³Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," October 26, 1965.

⁵⁴Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," March 28, 1967.

⁵⁵Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," January 10, 1967.

⁵⁶Steel, op. cit., "An Interview," p. 20.